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Gavin M LeightonAbstract
Cooperative behaviors are both prevalent and perplexing because selfish behaviors often return higher immediate
fitness benefits. Additionally, cooperative behaviors are a prominent component of the human behavioral repertoire
and therefore represent a useful teaching tool. To use cooperation as a teaching tool, I present software where
students participate in a public goods game via a set of laptops connected to a Wi-Fi network. The public goods
game entails multiple scenarios where students invest in a communal bank. The bank is then multiplied and money
is divided and returned to all individuals equally. In this public goods game, students can partake in scenarios
where reputation is displayed, as well as situations where individuals can punish players monetarily for not investing
in the public good. Utilizing these scenarios, instructors can introduce fundamental concepts in evolution
to students using intuitive interactive software.
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In simple models of natural selection individuals are
expected to be selfish and perform only those behaviors
that benefit their fitness. Indeed, Darwin held similar
ideas when he lamented that the altruistic and sterile
workers of eusocial insects were his “one special diffi-
culty” (Darwin 1859). Despite the preliminary descrip-
tion of nature as ruthless, individuals such as Kropotkin
(1902) recognized that cooperative behaviors, i.e. those
behaviors that increase the fitness of other individuals
(Lehmann and Keller 2006), were common. Moreover,
Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1997) argued that major
evolutionary transitions such as multicellularity rely on
cooperative behaviors between multiple entities. This
commonness of cooperative behaviors challenged the
assumptions of natural selection and necessitated a
re-evaluation of the evolutionary framework. Using
population genetics Hamilton (1964) formally defined
the concept of inclusive fitness, demonstrating that indi-
viduals could reduce their own direct fitness so long as
the fitness benefit to relatives compensated for the loss.
Hamilton’s theory provided an explanation for how someCorrespondence: gleighton@bio.miami.edu
Department of Biology, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33146, USA
© 2014 Leighton; licensee Springer. This is an O
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.or
in any medium, provided the original work is pcooperative behaviors can be maintained even though the
behavior is relatively detrimental to their direct fitness.
Hamilton’s theoretical work was labeled ‘kin selection’
(Maynard Smith and Wynne-Edwards, 1964), and has
been invoked as an explanation for the maintenance of
many cooperative behaviors (Sherman 1981; Hughes
et al. 2008; Lukas and Clutton-Brock 2012), including
behaviors that maintain communal resources (Frank 1995).
Communal resources that benefit the entire group, yet can
not be monopolized by one or a few individuals are known
as ‘public goods’ (Rankin et al. 2007). Since individuals can
not exclude others from the public good, individuals who
invest in the public good are at risk of having the invest-
ment exploited by uncooperative individuals (Rankin et al.
2007; Bourke 2011). The exploitation of public goods often
leads to a collapse of the common resource resulting in
a ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968). The instability
of public goods has generated considerable interest in
delineating the mechanisms that can stabilize public
goods, despite the risk of exploitation (Foster 2004;
Archetti and Scheuring 2010). The maintenance of public
goods has attracted researchers in biology, as well as in
economics, sociology, and psychology (Hardin 1998; Boyd
et al. 2003; Bowles 2006). From this multidisciplinarypen Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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roperly credited.
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nisms that can maintain the cooperative behaviors that
maintain public goods, including kin selection, punish-
ment, and generalized reciprocity (Boyd et al. 2010;
Barta et al. 2011).
Public goods therefore represent an opportunity to teach
students about behavior and evolution. Cooperative behav-
ior is an especially useful topic to teach students because
multiple evolutionary phenomena have been explored
both theoretically and empirically in humans. Punishment
(Fehr and Gachter 2002), reciprocity/reputation mecha-
nisms (Nowak and Sigmund 2005; Jacquet et al. 2011), and
intergroup competition (Darwin 1871; West et al. 2006)
are putative mechanisms that can maintain communal re-
sources in human groups. This previous research therefore
provides a framework that facilitates teaching students
about how evolution can shape behavior, and specifically
cooperative behavior. Students can learn about how the
benefit of exploitation can erode cooperative behaviors,
and subsequently how evolutionary mechanisms select for
cooperation. I present here an interactive, public goods
game that has been considerably modified from an inter-
active game provided by NetLogo (Wilensky 1999). The
original public goods game contained the framework for
the game, but required a series of alterations before it
was functional in the classroom. The redesigned pro-
gram and the practices described below can help teach
students about public goods phenomena and certain
mechanisms that may maintain public goods (punish-
ment and reputation). Thus, the interactive game can
help expose students to basic concepts in behavior and
evolution.
NetLogo is an open-source set of software that will
run on Windows, Apple OS X, or Linux. The NetLogo
software is designed with readable code and can be
manipulated with ease. The NetLogo manual and other
sources (Grimm and Railsback 2011) provide an ap-
proachable introduction for using NetLogo. While there
is other software that can run public goods games (see
Z-tree, Fischbacher (2007)), NetLogo has an active sup-
port community, is immediately downloadable, and is
written for biologists. Therefore the programming com-
mands are relevant to biologists and allow for modifica-
tions to the code that are useful for interactive biological
games and simulations. NetLogo also provides additional
interactive games and software that are relevant to
biological phenomena in the basic download.
To run the interactive software, both the instructor
and students need laptops or desktop computers that
are connected to a WiFi network and running the
same version of NetLogo. This interactive game was
successfully implemented and tested using two sets
of 25 students from an introductory animal behavior
class (Additional file 1).Game implementation
Appropriate student population
Students that participate in this exercise should have
an understanding of certain concepts before beginning
these exercises. Since this work relies on basic concepts
of selection, students should understand the concepts of
fitness and competition. Additionally, students should
have at least a rudimentary background in talking about
animal behavior and cooperative situations like the pris-
oner’s dilemma. Importantly, these public goods game
exercises could be implemented at the end of an intro-
ductory course, or at any point in an upper-level animal
behavior or evolution course. Therefore the range of
usefulness of these games extends to students of many
ages. Immediately before beginning the game, instructors
should step the students through the basic mathematics
of the game so that the students understand how the
communal bank is divided during game play.Game dynamics
The game presented here is similarly constructed to
other public goods games where individuals invest
money into a communal bank. In this game students
have a certain amount of money in their bank. The
student then decides what proportion of the bank to
contribute to the public good (between 0 or 100%). The
amount the student chooses to contribute will be en-
tered into a communal cash pot of money and all of the
investments into the communal cash pot are summed,
and then doubled. After doubling the amount of cash in
the communal pot, the communal pot is then divided
evenly among all the participants, regardless of how
much each participant had contributed. Thus, while it is
best for the group if every participant invests 100% of
their cash, it is always best for an individual to invest 0%
since they will be relatively wealthier than the other par-
ticipants. To gain a thorough understanding of the game
dynamics, instructors may prefer to run a small-scale
game by themselves using two to four laptops where the
instructor controls each laptop and can explore the
different scenarios (see below).Incentives
For this practice to be effective students should try to
acquire the most cash before the end of the simulation.
To facilitate competition, the instructor may elect to
give out a small amount of bonus points, or some other
reward for the students that place near the top of the
class (e.g. the top 1/3rd). The most useful system may
be a payoff system with high resolution where the top
scorer gets the maximum amount of bonus points, and
students are then ranked and benefitted according to
their final payoffs.
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To begin, the instructor should download the latest ver-
sion of NetLogo from the NetLogo website and install
the software on the local hard drive. The instructor
should then update Java© so that it is at least Java 6.0.
The instructor can then download the public goods
game and public goods client (described below) from
either the author’s website (http://www.gavinmleighton.
com/public-goods-interactive-game.html) or from the
author’s page (GMLeighton) on the open agent-based
modeling (ABM) consortium: www.openabm.org. After
downloading the software, the public goods game file
and the client file should be stored in the same folder on
the local hard drive. The instructor should then open
the downloaded game software using NetLogo. To have
the data file from the game output to the desktop, the
instructor should make a slight modification to the code
so that the software prints the data to the correct loca-
tion. Instructors should click on the “Code” button of
the main screen (upper center), and find the line that
begins with the file-open command. The file-open
command is followed by the destination for the data file.
For Mac OS users, instructors should type the following
after the file-open command (including quotation marks),
““/Users/(user)/Desktop/PublicGoodsGameClassRoom
Data.txt”. Importantly, the (user) aspect should be re-
placed by the name of the user on the computer. In-
structors will see “Leighton” listed in that slot in the
basic download and can replace “Leighton” with their
Mac OS username. For instructors operating Windows
systems, the instructor would have to change the path to,
“c:\Users\(user)\Desktop” and again change (user) to your
local username on the computer.
Upon opening the downloaded software, the instructor
will be given a prompt to start a session name, and
should give a unique name to the session. The instructor
should also click the box indicating that they would like
to broadcast the game. After opening the simulation, the
instructor should see a screen that contains multiple
simulation outputs and a series of buttons that control
game flow (Figure 1).
The instructor should either have the students to
download NetLogo to their laptops or local computer, or
have the students download NetLogo before the class
begins. Alternatively, if the game is run in a computer
lab the instructor may download NetLogo onto the com-
puters for the students. Students will then open the
“Hubnet” software that is found in the same folder as
the NetLogo software.
Entering the public goods game environment
After the instructor has opened the game, students
should open the “Hubnet” program on their laptops.
Hubnet is a program that is downloaded with NetLogoand will allow the students to interact in the simulation.
After opening Hubnet, students will be asked to enter a
name they will have for themselves and they should also
enter the IP address of the computer hosting the game.
The IP address can be found on the screen that appears
after the instructor successfully hosts the game. At this
point, all of the students should be logged into the game
that is being hosted by the instructor. The student
screen will allow them to see how much cash they have
accumulated, what the average amount of cash invested
is, and the average proportion of cash invested in the
communal bank (Figure 2). Additionally, the NetLogo
screen portrayed in Figure 2 will display all participant’s
names, the amount of money the individual has, the pro-
portion they invested in the previous turn, but will not
display participant names if in the anonymous scenario
(see below). In situations where the instructor has
turned on labels, students will also be able to see the
names of the other students and how much cash the
other students have.
Suggested game scenarios
The suggested set of scenarios I present will step stu-
dents through several mechanisms that are thought to
maintain cooperation. Each of these scenarios will ex-
pose students to a concept in the evolution and main-
tenance of cooperative behavior. The instructor can
visualize the findings two ways. First, the view from the
instructor’s screen can be projected onto a white board
to show how cooperation changes in real time. Second,
the instructor can cut and paste the values from the
game that are output to the text file into an Excel
spreadsheet and graph the investment in each of the
three scenarios.
Scenario 1 Learning Goal: Demonstrate that anonymous
interactions in public goods games hinder the mainten-
ance of cooperative behavior.
Expected Outcome: As seen in other public goods
games research, cooperative investment will start at rela-
tively high values and will quickly erode as there is not a
mechanism in place to enforce cooperation.
The first situation is the most basic, where there is
total anonymity and no punishment. Here, the instructor
will have to switch the “label’s-on?” switch to “off”.
When the game starts, only the amount of cash each of
the students has will be displayed in the screen. This
way, students can only compare the amount of cash they
have and the amounts other students own without
knowing which specific student has which specific dollar
amount. The instructor can then run a certain number
of steps (suggested is between 3–5 steps) where money is
collected from the students, multiplied, and then redistrib-
uted. These three commands (collection, multiplication,
Figure 1 The master screen that is displayed on the screen of the person hosting the simulation. The master screen controls game flow
and helps visualize the dynamics of the game. A. Switch that removes the player names on the right hand display screen. B. Slider that sets the
value of money punished individuals lose if punished by other players. C. Button that restarts the game and resets all values to initial values. D.
Button that runs the entire step once (including Take Money and Give Money and Plotting) E. Button that retrieves money from students. F.
Button to distribute money to students. Note, buttons associated with c and d are best used for demonstrating mathematics of game. G. Value
of bank in previous step. H. Number of turns that have taken place. I. Plot of total punishment over time. Note that punishment is the
cumulative punishment over time. J. Plot of communal bank over time. K. Plot of average investment of participants over time. L. Screen that
lists all player names, their cash on hand, and how much they invested in the previous turn. A red square appears next to the richest player.
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the “Go” button once, or by pressing the “Take Money”
and “Give money” buttons. After running the defined
number of steps, the instructor can give students time to
assess their relative standing and change the proportion of
their cash they want to invest. While the instructor may
choose to have students update the proportion they
choose to invest while clicking through steps, providing a
short amount of time would allow students to more accur-
ately gauge their relative standing. Importantly, for this
scenario and the following scenarios, the total number of
steps, or iterations, should be known only to the in-
structor so as to avoid mass defection on the last step
(Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Axelrod 1997).
Scenario 2 Learning Goal: Demonstrate that introdu-
cing reputation can influence the maintenance of co-
operative behavior.Expected Outcome: Students will be able to visualize
the names of other students on the screen and this will
incorporate reputation effects. Since both the shame of
not investing and the honor of investing a lot promote
cooperation (Jacquet et al. 2011), the average level of
cooperation should be higher than in scenario 1.
In this scenario, the instructor can turn labels on from
the main screen, so that students can now see the invest-
ment of other students in the group. This scenario will
work best if students know each other before the simula-
tion starts and can assign names to specific individuals.
Scenario 2 is intended to teach how cooperation may
be maintained by image scoring (Nowak and Sigmund
1998, 2005). Additionally, if an instructor would like to
focus on reputation and reciprocity, they may choose to
allow students to form their own smaller groups after
the entire population competes, as suggested in West
et al. (2006). This would emphasize that students that
Figure 2 The screen the participants will see after logging into the simulation being hosted. A. Player name. B. Button that allows player
to punish the richest player. C. Average proportion invested by all participants in the simulation. D. The total bank from the previous turn. E. How much
money the individual has. F. The slider the participant uses to dictate what proportion of their wealth to invest in the communal bank. G. The
money the individual invested in the previous turn. H. The average cash invested by participants in the simulation. I. A screen showing other
participants, their names, their total money, and how much they invested in the previous turn.
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most cooperative group members.Scenario 3 Learning Goal: Demonstrate that self-policing
can influence the maintenance of cooperative behavior.
Expected Outcome: The average level of cooperation
will be higher than in scenario 1 because the richest
student will be exposed to monetary punishment from
peers. The high level of monetary punishment should in-
duce higher levels of investment so as to avoid suffering
punishment for extended periods of time from other
players.
The third scenario can be implemented with or with-
out names though the progression of scenarios listed
here would suggest including names. At this point, the
instructor can allow students to punish the richest player
by clicking on the “Punish the richest player” button on
the student’s Hubnet windows (Figure 2). This scenario
introduces self policing and may help stabilize some
investment in the public good (Boyd et al. 2003). As the
game is set up now, the individual who punishes the
richest player pays $1 to reduce the richest player’s cash
by the amount determined on the slider on the instruc-
tor’s screen (Figure 1), though this can be changed in
the code easily. Importantly, this button can be clickedmultiple times and multiple individuals can punish the
richest individual.Scenario 4 Learning Goal: Demonstrate that a dedicated
police force can influence the maintenance of cooperation.
Expected Outcome: Cooperation will be maintained at
higher average levels than in scenario 1 and potentially
scenario 3, as the instructor will definitely punish indi-
viduals that do not cooperate at specified levels. Since
levels of punishment are unambiguous students will
cooperatively invest more.
In the final scenario, the instructor can log into the
simulation using Hubnet from their own computer to
act as the dedicated police force. The instructor may set
the rules, but an example is that the instructor will al-
ways contribute the average investment of the group so
as to not outcompete the students. In contrast, the in-
structor may also vary their contribution to the group
(i.e. invest 25% of the average proportion of students) so
that the police force becomes costly for members, and
observe this effect on the average levels of cooperation.
The instructor can also specify the rule for when they
will punish the richest player. For example, the instructor
may state that they will punish the richest player only if
the richest player contributed less than half of the group
Leighton Evolution: Education and Outreach 2014, 7:19 Page 6 of 7
http://www.evolution-outreach.com/content/7/1/19average investment. The goal of this scenario is to have a
police force without having interacting individuals have to
perform policing behaviors themselves.
Data output
Currently, the software will create an output file and
place the file on the desktop given some minor code
alterations (see Setup section above). After each step in
the simulation, the software writes the average propor-
tion of cash invested by the individuals in the simulation.
This output allows the instructor to plot the average
proportion invested after the simulation is over and use
the data to potentially explain concepts to the students
(see below).
Future directions
To help refine and improve the interactive game, a valu-
able next step would be to test if and how these games
improved understanding of public goods and the main-
tenance of cooperation. Preliminary exercises using this
software suggest that students are able to readily identify
evolutionary mechanisms that can maintain cooperation
(Leighton, unpublished data), though a more rigorous
analysis is needed. Such analysis would allow instructors
to further change how the game is implemented based
on the intended learning goals. An additional and inter-
esting test would be to perform these public goods
games in classes of different sizes and examine the influ-
ence of punishment empirically. While variation in class
size may yield insight into the effectiveness of punish-
ment, instructors may also be interested in performing
inter-group experiments within a single class. Intergroup
competition has received both empirical support (West
et al. 2006) and theoretical support (Wilson and Wilson
2007) as being able to support cooperation in humans.
Therefore, instructors could perform the scenarios de-
scribed above one day, and then break the class into
groups of five students each and award points to the
group that is able to acquire the largest communal bank
after 10 rounds. The new balance between where within-
group competition is reduced, along with increased group
competition, should promote higher levels of cooperation
in individuals (Bowles 2006). Finally, instructors may be
interested in varying the level of communication between
students. For instance, communication in smaller groups
may more effectively facilitate cooperation than allowing
for communication between students in larger classes, i.e.
20+ students. Such scenarios would further underline
the problem of trying to maintain public goods in large
groups.
Given the myriad of public goods relevant to human
society, e.g. CO2 emissions, vaccinations, group work in
class, performance-enhancing drugs in major league
sports, and group hunting, this set of games presents atangible and relatable set of exercises for instructors to
expose students to basic concepts in evolutionary biology.
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